

Log IT Summit --- June 2017







The Cyber Lifecycle

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Cyber – Why is it so darn hard?



- Human generated domain few "natural laws"
 - Filled with "oops", special cases, and surprises
- Properties:
 - Non-linear what's a dB of cyber?
 - Vulnerable today patched tomorrow?
 - Disruptive which is the whole point of adding it
 - Awesome capabilities...with a potential dark side
 - Inconsistent not always what you expect
 - Who is attempting what?
 - Often unpredictable complexity drives this
 - Insert unexpected value X weird thing Y happens
 - Easily "democratized" non-nation-states can become near "national" capable cyber powers w/ little effort
 - Big capabilities leave only a tiny –INT footprint no large infrastructure!
 - Cyber is a team sport new area for weapon system acquisitions -- new problem for new people, skillsets, processes, and organizations that have never played together before -- but MUST!

^{*}Comments provided by Rich Kutter, AFRL/RYW



Food for Thought: RAND



- Current policies are better suited to simple, stable, and predictable environments than to the complex, rapidly changing, and unpredictable reality of today's cybersecurity environment.
- Implementation of cybersecurity is not continuously vigilant throughout the life cycle of a military system.
- Control of and accountability for military system cybersecurity is spread over numerous organizations and is poorly integrated.
- Monitoring and feedback for cybersecurity is incomplete, uncoordinated, and insufficient for effective decision-making or accountability.

-"Cybersecurity of Air Force Weapon Systems", RAND Research Brief, 2016.



AF Cyber Campaign Plan: Weapon System Focus




Goal:

- #1 "Bake-In" cyber resiliency into new weapon systems
- #2 Mitigate "Critical" vulnerabilities in fielded weapon systems

7 Lines of Action (LOAs)

- LOA 1: Perform Cyber Mission Thread Analysis
- LOA 2: "Bake-In" Cyber Resiliency
- LOA 3: Recruit, Hire & Train Cyber Workforce
- LOA 4: Improve Weapon System Agility & Adaptability
- LOA 5: Develop Common Security Environment
- LOA 6: Assess & Protect Fielded Fleet
- LOA 7: Provide Cyber Intel Support



People, Processes, & Products

- Test & Evaluation (infrastructure/capability growth): Part of LOA 2
- Cyber Squadron Initiative (CS-I)
- Industrial Control Systems/SCADA cyber protection measures

Ensure mission success in a cyber contested environment



Roadmap to Resiliency




Present



Mission Assurance

- Mission Thread Analysis
- Develop assessment methodology framework
- Develop cyber acquisition workforce



System Assurance

- Assess and Fix
- Assess cyber posture of fielded systems
- Enable weapon system adaptability



Mx and Aircrew Trainers

$\int_{\Gamma} f(LOA_{\pi})$

Future

Institutionalize


- "Baked" in resiliency
 - Institutionalized methodology, tools, T&E infrastructure
 - Skilled workforce
 - Integrated cyber tools, policy, etc.





Applying Cyber Across All Domains








Applying Cyber Across the Lifecycle







Assuring Resiliency



- Ability of weapon systems to maintain mission effective capability under adversary offensive cyber operations
- Manage the risk of adversary cyber intelligence exploitation
- Resiliency is the ability to morph, change in the face of adversity
- "Cyber resiliency is the ability of cyber systems and cyber-dependent missions to anticipate, continue to operate correctly in the face of, recover from, and evolve to better adapt to advanced cyber threats" ---"Cyber Resiliency Engineering Aid, MITRE, Defense Innovation Marketplace, May 2015

Resiliency is key to cyber success and mission assurance Between, Among, Within and Across the Lifecycle



Questions?



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